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Washoe Cty. D.A.’s Office vs. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 67 (Oct. 08, 2020)1 
 
RECORD-SEALING: WRIT OF MANDAMUS, INHERENT AUTHORITY TO COMPEL 
 
Summary 
This is a consolidated challenge, consisting of three cases, by the Washoe County District 
Attorney’s Office against the Second Judicial District Court’s ability to compel the D.A.’s office 
to participate in a record-sealing proceeding if it chooses to neither stipulate nor oppose the 
petition to seal. The Nevada Supreme Court granted the Washoe County D.A.’s writ petitions 
and ruled that if the D.A.’s Office chooses not to participate in a proceeding, the district court 
does not have the ability to compel it to do so. 
 
Background 
NRS 179.245 instructs the district court to notify a variety of entities, including the D.A.s 
office that prosecuted the plaintiff of the filing of a petition to seal criminal records and further 
allows the D.A.’s office to testify and present evidence at any hearing related to it.2 In 2017, this 
statute was amended to clarify that district courts are not required to hold hearings on every such 
petition and enacted subsection 4 which allows the court to resolve the petition without a hearing 
if the D.A.’s office stipulates to sealing the records.3 If the D.A.’s office does not, then the 
hearing is required. NRS 179.2445 was also enacted, creating a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of sealing the records.4  
 
In 2019, Edward Harsh, Thomas Stokley, and Thomas McCall filed petitions to seal their 
criminal records. The district court notified the Washoe County D.A. that they had been filed and 
then, when no response was made, issued an Order to Respond, stating that the D.A.’s office had 
to issue a response or opposition to the Petition to Seal Records. Upon receiving this Order, the 
D.A.’s office filed 3 writ petitions challenging the ability of the district court to compel them to 
participate in the record-sealing proceedings. 
 
Discussion 
Entertaining the writ petitions is warranted  
The Court first discussed whether the writ of prohibition is proper. It decided that the 
Washoe County D.A. did not have an adequate remedy at law: if the D.A. was forced to 
participate in the record-sealing proceedings there would be no ability to redress the harm being 
inflicted.. The Court further found it important to entertain the writ because it believed that the 
question of whether a district court has the authority to compel a D.A.’s office to participate in a 
record sealing petition was an important legal issue in need of clarification. 
 
1  By Kelsey DeLozier. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245 (2020). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245(4) (2020). 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.2445 (2020). 
 
The district court lacks authority to compel the Washoe County D.A. to participate in a record-
sealing petition  
The D.A.’s office focused on NRS 179.245(3) and (4), and the permissible language such 
as “may” located within those provisions, to support the argument that the D.A.’s office is not 
required to participate.5 The D.A.’s office also argued that staying out of the record-sealing 
process follows legislative intent to streamline that process. 
The district court did not refute the D.A.’s interpretation, but instead claimed that it had 
the inherent authority to compel the D.A.’s office to participate under State ex rel. Marshall v. 
Eighth Judicial District Court where the Court determined that a district court had the inherent 
authority “to exercise reasonable control over a criminal proceeding.”6 The Court found that 
while the State ex rel. Marshall may have given the court this inherent authority in regards to  
criminal proceedings, a record-sealing petition is not a criminal proceeding, but a civil one under 
NRS 179.245(7).7 The Court also ruled that while the D.A.’s office must be notified about the 
filing of a petition, the petitioner is not required to serve the petition on the D.A. as would be 
necessary to make the D.A. a party to the proceedings. This further distinguishes the present case 
from State ex rel. Marshall, because the D.A. was a party in that case and, therefore, under the 
court’s authority.8  
The district court further argued that ordering the participation of the D.A.’s office was 
similar to issuing a writ of mandamus. However, the Court ruled that the writ must be for an act 
that the law enjoins as a duty, and because there is no duty for the Washoe County D.A. to 
participate in the record-sealing proceedings, it would not be applicable in this case. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Court held that the district court cannot compel the District Attorney’s office to 
participate in a record-sealing proceeding if the D.A. chooses to not do so. The D.A.’s 
consolidated petitions for a writ of mandamus, challenging the district court’s orders 
commanding the Washoe County District Attorney’s Office to participate in criminal record 
sealing proceedings, were granted. 
 
5  NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245(3) (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. §179.245 (4) (2020). 
6  State ex rel. Marshall v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 396 P.2d 680, 682 (Nev. 1964). 
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245(7) (2020). 
8  State ex rel. Marshall, 396 P.2d at 681. 
